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Abstract
This article analyzes the Enrica Lexie Arbitral Award, first of all, in rela-
tion to international law issues concerning the application of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The article then focuses on the 
question of the functional immunity of the two marines, from the point of view of 
the Tribunal’s assertion of its incidental jurisdiction to deal with the matter, as 
well as of the Tribunal’s affirmation of the existence of a customary international 
law rule applicable in the present case. Both conclusions appear unconvincing, 
also in light of the role of the two marines on board a merchant ship. In any case, 
the fact remains that the judgment has the merit of finally putting an end to a 
long-standing dispute, to the satisfaction of the two parties involved.
Keywords: law of the sea; freedom of navigation; jurisdiction according to 
UNCLOS; incidental jurisdiction; functional immunity; State officials; govern-
mental functions.
1. introduCtion
The arbitral award in the Enrica Lexie case, issued on 21 May 2020 by a 
tribunal constituted pursuant to Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), addresses numerous interesting legal issues. In 
particular, as evidenced by the writings contained in this Focus, the issues that 
determined the solution adopted, and on which the Tribunal therefore dwelts ex-
tensively, are the existence of a customary principle on the functional immunity 
from foreign criminal jurisdiction of the military as State bodies, and the scope 
of the notion of incidental jurisdiction.
The events that caused the judicial and diplomatic dispute between Italy and 
India and led to the Tribunal’s pronouncement are well known and will therefore 
not be retraced here in detail.1 On the other hand, it must be remembered that the 
* Of the Board of Editors. The author wishes to thank Giorgia Bevilacqua and Giuseppe 
Barra Caracciolo for their help.
1 On 15 February 2012 the Enrica Lexie, an Italian tanker coming from Singapore and 
bound for Djibouti, was approached by the Indian fishing vessel St. Antony while it was about 
20 miles off the State of Kerala in the Indian contiguous zone. The ship was carrying six Italian 
Navy riflemen in an anti-piracy function. Among them there were the sergeants Massimiliano 
Latorre and Salvatore Girone who, convinced that the St. Antony was about to launch a pirate 
attack against the Enrica Lexie, after having issued flash signals to the approaching vessel, 
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basis of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction lay in UNCLOS, and was justified, according 
to Article 288, (1), insofar as it related to a “dispute concerning the interpretation 
or application of this Convention”.2 In the case in point, however, the central 
issue, the real and fundamental subject of the dispute, was the ascertainment of 
the competence to exercise jurisdiction over the matter, a problem resolved, as 
mentioned above, in light of the rules on immunity. Hence the use of an “en-
larged” notion of incidental jurisdiction by the Tribunal, which, otherwise, would 
have had to declare itself not competent, since there was no need to rule under 
UNCLOS.
Contrary to what one might expect without having read the text of the deci-
sion, the law of the sea issues are therefore much less decisive. However, this 
does not mean that the decision in question does not present aspects of interest to 
law of the sea scholars, aspects on which we will focus in the following pages. 
fired some shots from which resulted the death of two Indian fishermen. Induced to enter the 
port of Kochi by the Indian authorities, the Enrica Lexie was detained and the Italian sergeants 
were subjected to Indian criminal proceedings for the murder of the two fishermen. These 
events led to a long judicial and diplomatic dispute between Italy and India regarding which 
State should exercise criminal jurisdiction over the incident. After more than three years of 
fruitless negotiations, in April 2015 Italy unilaterally activated the mandatory arbitration pro-
cedure provided for by Annex VII to the UNCLOS Convention (Art. 286). It also requested, 
first from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and then from the Arbitral 
Tribunal, the adoption of some precautionary measures. First, pending the constitution of the 
Arbitral Tribunal, Italy availed itself of the possibility provided for by Art. 290(5) UNCLOS 
and asked the ITLOS Tribunal to issue provisional measures against India consisting in the 
abstention from exercising its jurisdiction over the incident and the cessation of restrictions 
on the personal freedom of Sergeants Girone and Latorre. ITLOS, although not accepting the 
Italian request, with the order of 24 August 2015, established the obligation of both States to 
suspend the jurisdictional proceedings in progress and to refrain from initiating new ones. This 
precautionary measure also pursued the objective of avoiding that the continuation or initia-
tion of jurisdictional proceedings could jeopardize, if not frustrate, the execution of any rulings 
of the then constituted Arbitral Tribunal. It also had the function of preventing the extension 
or escalation of the dispute, in accordance with ITLOS’s constant orientation on provisional 
measures. Having constituted the Arbitral Tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration on 
8 September 2015, Italy also submitted to the latter a precautionary appeal pursuant to Art. 
290(1) UNCLOS in which it requested that Sergeant Girone be allowed to return to his home-
land pending a final ruling. By order of 29 April 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal, noting the absence 
of a legal requirement justifying Girone’s physical stay in India, upheld the Italian appeal and 
established obligations of cooperation between the States in order to preserve their respective 
rights. For further information and insights please refer, in addition to the articles published in 
this Forum, to the review on the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and other Law 
of the Sea jurisdictions edited in this Volume by treves. The issue was already dealt with in 
this Yearbook by ronzitti, “The Enrica Lexie Incident: Law of the Sea and Immunity of State 
Officials Issues”, IYIL, 2012, p. 3 ff.
2 UNCLOS subjects the settlement of disputes (between States that have ratified it) relat-
ing to its interpretation and application to a mandatory regime. At the moment of ratification, 
as a rule, the State communicates its choice of instrument to be used for resolving disputes, 
selected among the various instruments proposed by the Convention itself. However, in the 
event of inconsistent declarations, as in the present case, the competence is attributed to an 
arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII of UNCLOS (Art. 287).
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Only afterwards will we humbly but briefly allow ourselves to give our opinion 
also on the two main issues mentioned above.
As early as the stage of provisional measures, the Tribunal made some in-
teresting statements relating to aspects of the law of the sea.3 By order of 29 
April 2016, the Tribunal, noting the absence of a legal requirement justifying the 
physical detention of one of the two Italian marines in India,4 upheld the Italian 
appeal by establishing obligations of cooperation between the States in order to 
preserve their respective rights.5 It is interesting to note that the Tribunal justi-
fied the precautionary measure not only by the need to prevent the dispute from 
escalating or spreading, but also because of “considerations of humanity” which 
were raised in relation to the limitation of the personal freedom of one of the two 
Italian marines.6 In fact, the Tribunal, while not considering it necessary to dwell 
on the issue of possible violation of international human rights standards, stated 
that “social isolation has been recognized as a relevant factor in considering the 
relaxation of bail conditions” and it was therefore necessary “to give effect to the 
3 In fact, it is well known that, having constituted the Arbitral Tribunal at The Hague 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on 8 September 2015, Italy submitted a precautionary 
appeal pursuant to Art. 290(1) UNCLOS in which it requested that also Sergeant Girone, one 
of the two “indicted” Marine riflemen (the other, Commander Latorre, was already in Italy 
for health reasons) could return to his homeland pending a final ruling. See Order of 29 April 
2016, Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures, PCA Case No. 2015-28. All docu-
mentation of the arbitration proceedings is available at: <www.pcacpa.org>.
4 The interim measures ordered on 24 August 2015 by the ITLOS, which resulted in the 
suspension of all domestic court proceedings, were still in effect at the time. Thus, the Tribunal 
observed that “there would be no legal interest in Sergeant Girone’s physical presence in India” 
and that, ultimately, “no material change would result for India” (Order, cit. supra note 3, para. 
107). On the precautionary measures adopted by the two Courts, see virzo, “Le misure cau-
telari nell’affare dell’incidente della Enrica Lexie”, Osservatorio Costituzionale, 2016, p. 1 ff.; 
perrotta, “Il caso Enrica Lexie e la tutela cautelare dei diritti individuali nelle pronunce del 
Tribunale internazionale per il diritto del mare e dell’Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal: tra inherent 
powers e human rights approach”, Politica del diritto, 2016, p. 279 ff.; Cannone, “L’ordinanza 
del Tribunale internazionale del diritto del mare sulla vicenda della Enrica Lexie”, RDI, 2015, 
p. 1144 ff.; papaniColopulu, “Commento a margine dell’ordinanza del tribunale arbitrale nel 
caso Enrica Lexie”, RDI, 2016, p. 763 ff.
5 It should be noted that the Tribunal considered that the requirement of urgency of the 
measure, even if not expressly mentioned in Art. 290(1) UNCLOS, must be taken into account 
for the purposes of prescription of precautionary measures (Order, cit. supra note 3, para. 85). 
In the present case, the Tribunal wished to prevent the occurrence of a real and imminent risk 
of prejudice to the rights of the parties while waiting for its final decision, as this risk presented 
itself as “particularly pronounced”.
6 According to the Tribunal, the measures restricting the liberty of the Italian Navy rifle-
man, in light of the time presumably necessary for the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings 
and of the possible criminal trial in one of the two States, would most likely be in contrast with 
international human rights obligations. A significant exhortation to respect international hu-
man rights standards is also contained in the motivations of the award rendered by the Arbitral 
Tribunal constituted under Annex VII UNCLOS in the case of the Arctic Sunrise Arbitration 
(Netherlands v. Russia), Award on the Merits of 14 August 2015, PCA Case No. 2014-02, para. 
198.
172 FOCUS: THE ENRICA LEXIE AWARD
concept of considerations of humanity”.7 These considerations of humanity came 
to the fore precisely because of a systematic and coordinated interpretation of the 
norms of the UNCLOS with the norms of general international law.8 Systematic, 
because in UNCLOS there are provisions having as their object the protection of 
life at sea9 and other human rights;10 coordinated, because Article 293 UNCLOS 
provides that an international tribunal competent under UNCLOS may also apply 
other rules of international law, provided that they are not incompatible with it.11 
We agree with this evolutionary interpretation of UNCLOS, certainly in line with 
the value that the protection of human rights has assumed in the international 
order.
2. Freedom oF naviGation. Who violated it?
The Tribunal then dealt with the mutual accusations of violation of freedom 
of navigation between the two States. First of all, with regard to the impact on 
the freedom of navigation of the Enrica Lexie of the request by the Maritime 
Rescue Coordination Centre in Mumbai to the master to proceed to the port of 
Kochi when the vessel was 38 nautical miles from the coast, it was not relevant to 
establish, for this purpose, the exact location of the incident or the position of the 
7 See Order, cit. supra note 3, para. 104. Interestingly, the same concerns had also been 
expressed by Judge Jesus in his Separate Opinion attached to the 25 August 2015 ITLOS 
Order in which he stated (paras. 10-11): “[t]he detenction or restriction on the movement of 
persons who wait excessively long to be charged with criminal offenses is, per se, a punish-
ment without a trial” and regretted the fact that ITLOS had not taken into account “the effects 
on the health of the marines and their family as a result of a detention that has continued […] 
for three and a half years”.
8 This consideration is made by virzo, cit. supra note 4, p. 3 ff.; See also, for analogous 
statements, papaniColopulu, cit. supra note 4, pp. 773-774. More generally on the issue of 
interpretation of UNCLOS provisions see del veCChio and virzo (eds.), Interpretation of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea by International Courts and Tribunals, 
Heidelberg, 2019.
9 See Arts. 18, para. 2, and 98 UNCLOS.
10 See, for example, Art. 73, para. 3, which affirms: “[t]his Convention shall not alter the 
rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from other agreements compatible with this 
Convention and which do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the 
performance of their obligations under this Convention”.
11 On the applicability of international human rights standards, reference is also made to 
the compatibility clause included in Art. 311, para. 2, UNCLOS, according to which: “[t]his 
Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from other 
agreements compatible with this Convention and which do not affect the enjoyment by other 
States Parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations under this Convention”. 
For reference to international human rights standards, again in the case Arctic Sunrise, accord-
ing to ITLOS (para. 198): “the Tribunal may, therefore, pursuant to Article 293, have regard 
to the extent necessary to rules of customary international law, including international human 
rights standards, not incompatible with the Convention, in order to assist it in the interpretation 
and application of the Convention’s provisions that authorize the arrest or detention of a vessel 
and persons”. In legal literature see treves, “Human Rights and the Law of the Sea”, Berkeley 
Journal of International Law, 2010, p. 1 ff.
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Italian vessel and at the same time to ascertain whether the rules on the contigu-
ous zone or the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) should apply, since in any case 
the Italian vessel would have been entitled to the same freedom of navigation as 
on the high seas. This is in accordance with Article 33 UNCLOS, which limits the 
permitted grounds for affecting foreign navigation in the contiguous zone to the 
prevention and repression of violations of customs, fiscal, health and immigra-
tion laws, and with Articles 87(1) and 92(1), which recognize, respectively, the 
principles of freedom of navigation and exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State on 
the high seas, applicable also in the EEZ by express provision of Article 58(1)12 
and 58(2)13 
As far as the violation of the first principle is concerned,14 Italy supported 
its thesis by referring to the Indian Maritime Zones Act of 1976. This piece of 
legislation is still in force despite its provisions being inspired by an excessively 
“patrimonialistic” vision of the EEZ that is rejected by UNCLOS, which, as is 
known, has achieved a compromise in this regard between the developing States 
theories and those of industrialized countries. This vision of the EEZ, however, 
often recurs in the practice and legislation of Asian countries, first and foremost 
China.15 The Indian conception of the contiguous zone, as revealed by the judg-
ment of the Indian Supreme Court of 18 January 2013, again in relation to the 
Enrica Lexie’s incident, does not appear to be entirely in accordance with inter-
national law. The Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of India over the two 
marines under the Indian Penal Code, the application of which was extended by 
12 The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (The Italian Republic v. The Republic of India), Award of 
21 May 2020, PCA Case No. 2015-28, para. 308.
13 Ibid., para. 315.
14 See Art. 87 UNCLOS (“Freedom of the high seas”), which recognizes that on the high 
seas States enjoy: “freedom of navigation; freedom of overflight; freedom to lay submarine 
cables and pipelines; freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted 
under international law, subject to Part VI; freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid 
down in section 2; freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII”.
15 China has repeatedly objected, even with the use of force, to the conduct of military ma-
noeuvers in its EEZ, for example almost ramming the US destroyer Decatur on 30 September 
2018 near the Spratly Islands, occupied by China but also claimed by Malaysia, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam. Indeed, China claims to condition such operations on its consent, 
believing them to be a potential threat to its security, and not permitted by UNCLOS. In fact, 
this aspect of Chinese practice, which in any case conflicts with international practice and does 
not appear sustainable in the light of UNCLOS provisions, is part of a more general attempt 
to impose a peculiar interpretation of the institution of the EEZ. This State, in fact, manages 
its EEZ almost as if it represents its territorial waters, in particular in the South China Sea (or 
Oriental Sea, as defined by Vietnam), and this attitude is also part of China’s attempt to assert 
its claims of exclusive control of that area, claims which are, however, disputed by other States 
bordering that same Sea and which in turn claim sovereignty or jurisdiction in those waters. In 
this regard, see FranCkx and Gautier (eds.), The Exclusive Economic Zone and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982-2000: A Preliminary Assessment of State 
Practice, Bruxelles, 2003; FranCkx, “The 200-mile Limit: Between Creeping Jurisdiction 
and Creeping Common Heritage?”, George Washington International Law Review, 2007, p. 
467 ff.; BeCkman, “The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in 
the South China Sea”, AJIL, 2013, p. 142 ff.
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the Maritime Zones Act of 1976 to the contiguous zone for reasons generically 
defined as “of security”, and as such not included among the specific matters in 
relation to which the coastal State is allowed to exercise its powers within 24 
miles from the coast.16 However, the Tribunal, considering the reference to the 
provisions of the Indian law of 1976 concerning the EEZ and the contiguous 
zone irrelevant to the decision, stated that the Indian request to the Enrica Lexie’s 
captain to proceed towards the port of Kochi represented an interference too ab-
stract to constitute a violation of the freedom of navigation.17 The hypothesis that 
the entry of the Enrica Lexie in the Indian territory had been determined by the 
request to cooperate in an investigation related to piracy events which then turned 
out to be non-existent, and the consideration that if the Enrica Lexie had not com-
plied with the request it could have been accused of violation of the UNCLOS 
provisions which impose obligations of cooperation between States in the fight 
against maritime piracy, in particular of Article 100 UNCLOS read in conjunc-
tion with Article 300, was thus dismissed without too much consideration.18
On the other hand, the Tribunal was of a different opinion with respect to 
Italy’s responsibility for the interference with the navigation of the St. Antony, 
the Indian fishing vessel shot at by the Italian Navy’s riflemen. According to the 
Tribunal, the change of course which the St. Antony was forced to make as a con-
sequence of the Italian military action was the responsibility of the Italian State, 
constituting a violation of the freedom of navigation of the said vessel pursuant 
to Articles 87 and 90 UNCLOS.19 On these grounds, the Tribunal ordered Italy to 
pay compensation for material and moral damages caused.20
16 Judgment of 18 January 2013 of the Federal Supreme Court of India in the case Republic 
of Italy and others v. Republic of India and others, available at: <http://www.sidi-isil.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/SUPREME-COURT-OF-INDIA-18.01.2013.pdf>. On the specific 
point see Wu, “The Enrica Lexie Incident: Jurisdiction in the Contiguous Zone?”, Cambridge 
International Law Journal, 19 April 2014, available at: <http://cilj.org.uk/2014/04/19/enrica-
lexie-incident-jurisdiction-contiguous-zone/>.
17 Award, cit. supra note 12, para. 504, in which the arbitral tribunal addresses the Italian 
argument according to which: “the evidence on the record permits the conclusion that, since 
the ‘Enrica Lexie’ initially had no intention of proceeding to the Indian coast, there was a 
‘causal effect’ of India’s intervention on the ‘Enrica Lexie’’s turn for Kochi. While such a 
causal effect is undeniable, in the sense that, had the MRCC not requested the ‘Enrica Lexie’ to 
proceed to Kochi, the ‘Enrica Lexie’ would not have changed course, such effect is too remote 
to amount to ‘interference’ with Italy’s freedom of navigation”.
18 On the possible violation by the Indian authorities of the principles of good faith and 
friendly relations between States see avenia, “Una rilettura del caso Enrica Lexie e dei due 
fucilieri della marina militare italiana”, Rivista della Cooperazione Giuridica Internazionale, 
2016, p. 171 ff.
19 Award, cit. supra note 12, para. 1043. On these aspects please refer to ronzitti, “Il 
caso della Enrica Lexie e la sentenza arbitrale nella controversia Italia-India”, RDI, 2020, p. 
937 ff.
20 Award, cit. supra note 12, para. 1088. In particular, the court ordered Italy to adopt 
measures of a satisfactory nature, such as the acknowledgement of the unlawful act, and to pay 
compensation for material damages relating to the killing and wounding of members of the 
crew of the St. Antony as well as for the “moral harm” suffered by the captain of the St. Antony 
and his crew. On 9 April 2021 the Indian Supreme Court declared that the case will be defini-
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The reason that this finding has caused so much consternation is that the 
freedom of navigation was deemed to have been violated without first verifying 
the occurrence or not of the elements of legitimate defence. In other words, could 
the behaviour of the fishing boat give rise to the legitimate suspicion that it was 
in fact a pirate boat about to attack the Enrica Lexie? If the answer was positive, 
the interference would have been justified. It must be presumed that the Tribunal 
implicitly gave a negative answer to this hypothesis when it determined Italian 
responsibility for violation of freedom of navigation, despite the fact that the 
Tribunal itself has referred the merits of the legitimate defence question to the 
Italian courts. However, in our opinion, the fact that the Tribunal made its find-
ing on freedom of navigation without having assessed a possible defence against 
liability is not acceptable.
Also with reference to the subjective attribution of the offence in question, 
Italy argued that no infringement could be attributed to it vis-à-vis India as the 
St. Antony was not identifiable as an Indian vessel, in that it was not flagged and 
was not registered in the maritime register of that country. On this point, the 
Tribunal correctly reaffirmed the customary principle, codified in Article 91(1) 
UNCLOS, that States enjoy a wide discretion in determining the criteria on 
which the attribution of the flag is founded and that the so-called requirement of 
a “genuine link” with the State (referred to in the last paragraph of Article 91(1) 
UNCLOS) cannot entail the consequence of third States challenging the link of 
nationality.21 Therefore, since Indian legislation provides that small boats are not 
required to fly the flag and are exempt from registration in the maritime register, 
this circumstance had no weight in the assessment of the conduct attributable 
to Italy.22
3. JurisdiCtion on the Case aCCordinG to unClos
Moreover, the question relating to the attribution of jurisdiction over the 
events that occurred was, of course, primarily addressed in light of the provisions 
of UNCLOS. Italy, first of all, proposing an extensive interpretation, affirmed the 
lack of Indian jurisdiction in light of Article 97 UNCLOS, which at paragraph 1 
provides that
In the event of a collision or any other incident of navigation con-
cerning a ship on the high seas, involving the penal or disciplinary 
responsibility of the master or of any other person in the service 
tively closed once the Italian State has paid the compensation granted (100 million rupees, 
equal to around 1.1 million euros) into an account of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Delhi.
21 On this point see ronzitti, “Il caso della Enrica Lexie”, cit. supra note 19, p. 948. On 
the issue, in general, of the attribution of the flag and of the requirement of the “genuine link”, 
we refer to the ITLOS Judgment of 1 July 1999 in the M/V “Saiga” (N. 2) Case (Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines v. Guinea), ITLOS Reports, 1999, p. 10 ff., para. 63.
22 Award, cit. supra note 12, paras. 1017-1035. 
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of the ship, no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be instituted 
against such person except before the judicial or administrative au-
thorities either of the flag State or of the State of which such person 
is a national.
On this point, however, the Tribunal, accepting the Indian argument, held 
that this rule was not applicable to the case in question, since the event at issue 
could not be qualified as an accident of navigation, as “damage [to St. Antony] 
and mortal harm [to its crew] were not caused by the movement or manoeuvr-
ing of either ship”, but from few shots fired at the St. Antony.23 The argument 
had also been put forward by the Italian side before the Indian Federal Supreme 
Court which, in its above mentioned judgment of 18 January 2013, had expressed 
itself in terms quite similar to those used by the Tribunal, stating that “a homicide 
caused by the voluntary opening of fire cannot constitute an ‘incident of naviga-
tion’ within the meaning of this provision”.24
In fact, the rule in question has a special character (otherwise it would not be 
possible to understand its rationale, as, at a general level, the principle codified 
in the already mentioned Article 92 UNCLOS applies) and finds its genesis in 
the famous case decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
in 1927, concerning a collision between the ship Lotus, flying the French flag, 
and a Turkish steamer on the high seas with the consequent arrest, in Turkey, of 
the French officer held responsible for the event which caused the death of eight 
people.25 The Court affirmed, on the basis of the principle of freedom of the seas, 
the unlawfulness of any authoritarian intervention on other nations’ ships (e.g., 
the carrying out of police investigations, the arrest of persons, the collection of 
testimonies and the like, in short, all enforcement activities). However, the Court 
did not assert the unlawfulness of the exercise of jurisdiction (judicial jurisdic-
tion) by a State within its own territory in relation to facts occurring in interna-
tional waters. In order to overcome the uncertainties that the PCIJ had to remedy 
with its judgment, and not incidentally on a proposal by France, the International 
Law Commission (ILC) formulated in 1956 the rule inserted in the Geneva 
Convention of 1958 on the high seas and finally in Article 97 of UNCLOS. The 
rule is therefore applied, as correctly decided by the Tribunal, only in cases of 
navigation accidents occurring on the high seas. Thus, exclusive criminal juris-
23 Award, cit. supra note 12, para. 652.
24 Republic of Italy and others, cit. supra note 16, para. 94.
25 Judgment of 7 September 1927, PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 10. On the basis of the 
compromise between France and Turkey, the PCIJ had to decide whether Turkey, by exercising 
criminal jurisdiction over a foreign national for acts committed on the high seas, “had acted 
in violation of the principles of international law – and if so, which ones”. The Court affirmed 
that the territoriality of the criminal law, even if it implies that no State can exercise its punitive 
power in the territory of another State, is not an absolute principle, as demonstrated by the fact 
that “all or nearly all these systems of law extend their action to offences committed outside 
the territory of the State which adopts them, and they do so in ways which vary from State to 
State. The territoriality of criminal law, therefore, is not an absolute principle of international 
law and by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty” (ibid., p. 20).
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diction is attributed to the flag State or to the national State of the authors of the 
incident, in cases limited to collisions and other navigation accidents such as, for 
example, the breaking of submarine telegraph or telephone cables, and damages 
however produced to ships or installations of other States. In other cases, the 
rule that the ship is subject to the exclusive power of the government of the flag 
State remains unchanged, but this is only in the sense that other States cannot 
perform acts of government on board and towards the ship itself.26 By the same 
26 On this point please refer to ConForti, “In tema di giurisdizione penale per fatti com-
messi in acque internazionali”, in Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Tesauro, Napoli, 2014, Vol. IV, 
p. 2619 ff. (in particular pp. 2624-2625). He states that: “It is known that the principle of inter-
national law applicable to criminal jurisdiction over the foreigner (jurisdiction always admitted 
over the citizen) is that it is exercisable always when and only when, even if it is about crimes 
committed in foreign territory, they present some connection with the territorial State and/or 
its subjects. Well, it is hard to see why this rule should not also apply when the foreign territory 
is… fluctuating. Moreover, even current practice, although not abundant, points in this direc-
tion. To summarize: it may be that the crime takes place entirely on a foreign ship. In this case 
there should be no doubt about the right of the State other than that of the flag to exercise juris-
diction if the victim is one of its nationals. In the case of an offense whose action is committed 
on board a foreign ship but the event occurs on board another ship and to the detriment of a 
national of the State to which such ship belongs, the latter has two titles to exercise jurisdic-
tion: the nationality of the victim and the event occurring on the ship which has his nationality. 
This is a case of competing jurisdiction with that of the State of the flag or the national State 
of the perpetrator of the offence, a competition which will in fact be resolved in favour of the 
State in whose territory the offender is located, which will obviously be free to hand him over 
to one of the other States or will be obliged to hand him over if bound by an extradition treaty” 
(our translation from Italian). Recently, in the sense of considering accidents of navigation 
those caused by the movement of the ship, see maGi, “Criminal Conduct on the High Seas: Is a 
General Rule on Jurisdiction to Prosecute Still Missing?”, RDI, 2015, p. 79 ff., in particular pp. 
89 ff. and 92. For a partially different thesis, regarding in particular the reading of Art. 92 in the 
sense that this rule provides for “both enforcing and prescriptive jurisdiction”, and that there-
fore Art. 97 is redundant, see ronzitti, “The Enrica Lexie Incident”, cit. supra note 1, p. 3 ff. 
(14-15 in particular); id., “La difesa contro i pirati e l’imbarco di personale militare armato sui 
mercantili: il caso della Enrica Lexie e la controversia Italia-India”, RDI, 2013, p. 1073 ff., es-
pecially p. 1086 ff., who sets out examples of shipping accidents not requiring physical contact 
but which, on the one hand, seem to be oriented towards the first type of interpretation and, 
at the same time, raise the possibility of a more modern interpretation than the one we have 
called “restrictive”, in order to take into account the evolution of practice and other accidents 
whose occurrence was unthinkable at the time of the adoption of UNCLOS. References to the 
possible restrictive or extensive interpretation of Art. 97 UNCLOS in light of the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of India of 18 January 2013, are in del veCChio, “Il ricorso all’arbitrato 
obbligatorio UNCLOS nella vicenda dell’Enrica Lexie”, RDIPP, 2014, p. 259 ff., in particular 
p. 265. On the other hand, the individual opinion of Justice Chelameswar attached to the Indian 
Supreme Court’s 2013 judgment that Art. 97 would not apply ratione loci anyway because it 
applies on the high seas and the incident had occurred in the EEZ appears to be unsustain-
able. Pursuant to Art. 58(2) UNCLOS, as already noted above, the high seas regime, and in 
particular Arts. 88 to 115 and “other relevant rules of international law”, apply to the EEZ 
unless inconsistent with its regime. For greater detail on the different theories relating to Art. 
97 and on the solution reached by the Tribunal on the issue see Cannone, “L’interpretazione 
della espressione ‘altri incidenti di navigazione’ di cui all’art. 97 della Convenzione sul diritto 
del mare nella sentenza arbitrale del 21 maggio 2020 relativa alla vicenda della Enrica Lexie 
(Italia c. India)”, Ordine internazionale e diritti umani, 2021, p. 283 ff.
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token, the thesis according to which the term “navigation accident” is intended 
to mean exclusively an accident involving “navigation activities” due to fate and 
unforeseeable circumstances, and not to voluntary or intentional human acts, is 
confirmed by the preparatory works of Article 97,27 and also by the formulation 
of another article of UNCLOS, namely Article 221(2) which, even if “for the 
purposes of this article”, clarifies that “‘maritime casualty’ means a collision of 
vessels, stranding or other incident of navigation, or other occurrence on board a 
vessel or external to it resulting in material damage or imminent threat of mate-
rial damage to a vessel or cargo”. This interpretation, moreover, combines in a 
systematic way the provisions of Article 97 with those of Article 94 UNCLOS(7) 
providing that:
Each State shall cause an inquiry to be held by or before a suitably 
qualified person or persons into every marine casualty or incident 
of navigation on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and 
causing loss of life or serious injury to nationals of another State or 
serious damage to ships or installations of another State or to the 
marine environment. The flag State and the other State shall coop-
erate in the conduct of any inquiry held by that other State into any 
such marine casualty or incident of navigation.
As mentioned above, Italy was very insistent, both before the Indian courts 
and before the Tribunal, in its attempts to assert the applicability of Article 97 
UNCLOS to the case at hand. The reason for this is intuitive. First of all, if 
this argument had been accepted by the Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
would have been established in an incontrovertible manner, since it would have 
been undisputed at this point that what was at stake was a “dispute concerning 
the interpretation or application of this Convention”, according to Article 288, 
paragraph 1, UNCLOS. Secondly, only the acceptance of the applicability of 
Article 97 could have excluded Indian jurisdiction altogether, as any other solu-
tion would have to deal, at least, with the two countries’ competing theories on 
jurisdiction, and the Tribunal would have to determine who was entitled to exer-
cise its jurisdiction on a priority or exclusive basis.
Having rejected the main argument of the Italian defence, the starting point 
was therefore that the concurring jurisdiction of the two countries should be rec-
ognized, but that, in concrete terms, it was necessary to determine the rules for 
its exercise in the case in question.28 The Tribunal then assessed whether the 
exercise of Indian criminal jurisdiction was prevented by the duty to recognize 
27 See nordquist et al. (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A 
Commentary, Dordrecht, 1995, Vol. III, p. 167 ff.
28 For the doctrine in favor of concurrent jurisdiction, see ConForti, “In tema di giurisdiz-
ione”, cit. supra note 26, p. 2619 ff.; GuilFoyle, “Shooting Fishermen Mistaken for Pirates: 
Jurisdiction, Immunity and State Responsibility”, EJIL: Talk!, 2 March 2012, available at: 
<https://www.ejiltalk.org/shooting-fishermen-mistaken-for-pirates-jurisdiction-immunity-
and-state-responsibility/>.
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the immunity of the two soldiers, a thesis already supported by Italy both before 
the Indian internal judicial bodies and on a diplomatic level. The answer, accord-
ing to the Tribunal, could not be sought in the UNCLOS itself, since the relevant 
rules in the Convention either concern limitations on coastal State enforcement in 
spaces other than those in which India had exercised its powers,29 or, with respect 
to immunities, refer exclusively and specifically to warships or other ships used 
for non-commercial purposes.30
We certainly agree with these findings. At this point, however, having aban-
doned the “safe” ground represented by UNCLOS, before proceeding to the anal-
ysis of Italy’s claim regarding the functional immunity of the Italian Marines from 
Indian criminal jurisdiction on the basis of customary law, the Arbitral Tribunal 
had first to establish whether it had jurisdiction over this specific claim.31
4. the FunCtional immunity oF the italian marines: an inCidental 
question to the appliCation oF unClos
The analysis of this procedural issue appears rather complex and contro-
versial; specifically, in order to determine whether it was entitled to exercise 
jurisdiction over Italy’s claim regarding the immunity ratione materiae of the 
Marines, the Tribunal had first to determine what kind of relationship existed be-
tween two different questions: whereas a first question concerned the entitlement 
of jurisdiction over the incident, a second question concerned the immunity of 
the two Italian Marines from Indian criminal jurisdiction.
The issue arose because UNCLOS tribunals, like other international special-
ized tribunals and courts, have a limited competence ratione materiae which, as 
already said, is limited to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of 
UNCLOS.32 Consequently, the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals is limited to 
claims based on UNCLOS provisions. Thus, the Tribunal was certainly compe-
29 Award, cit. supra note 12, para. 798, in which the Tribunal states that these rules ap-
ply: “to the exercise of rights and duties in the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone 
by coastal States, while the evidence in the present case demonstrates that India enforced its 
jurisdiction over the Marines only in its internal waters and on land, when the Marines were 
arrested and detained […]”.
30 Award, cit. supra note 12, para. 799, where the Tribunal affirms: “Articles 95 and 96, 
also invoked by Italy, do not address the immunity of persons, namely individuals who may 
be described as State officials. They address, first in Article 95, the immunity of warships, and 
second in Article 96, the immunity of ships ‘owned or operated by a State and used only on 
government non-commercial service’ […]”.
31 Award, cit. supra note 12, paras. 795-811.
32 On the international instruments potentially available in order to solve the dispute 
between Italy and India, see del veCChio, “Il caso dei due Marò e i possibili strumenti di 
soluzione obbligatoria della controversia”, in Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Tesauro, cit. supra 
note 26, Vol. IV, p. 2631 ff.; milano, “Il caso ‘Marò’: alcune considerazioni sull’utilizzo di 
strumenti internazionali di risoluzione delle controversie”, SIDIBlog, 3 April 2013, available 
at: <http://www.sidiblog.org/2013/04/03/il-caso-maro-alcune-considerazioni-sullutilizzo-di-
strumenti-internazionali-di-risoluzione-delle-controversi/>.
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tent to deal with the first question mentioned above concerning which State had 
jurisdiction over the Enrica Lexie incident, as the respective claims were based 
on a number of UNCLOS provisions. Yet, in theory, the Tribunal does not seem 
to have had competence to deal with the second question mentioned above, con-
cerning the immunity of the Marines, which was mainly based, as we will see, on 
general international law.
The exclusion of certain issues ratione materiae can be explained by look-
ing at the aim of compromissory clauses included in international treaties. Their 
aim is to distinguish the category of disputes which fall within their scope, from 
those which fall outside their scope.33 Accordingly, in the present case, claims 
based on rules which fall outside UNCLOS provisions should normally be ex-
cluded. Exceptionally, however, international specialized tribunals can, to an ex-
tent, have incidental jurisdiction, depending on the instrument that grants them 
jurisdiction.34 The latter, therefore, potentially provided a way forward for the 
Arbitral Tribunal to establish its exceptional jurisdiction over the second question 
concerning the immunity of the two Italian Marines. In essence, the Tribunal had 
to decide whether the two questions concerning the jurisdiction over the incident 
and the immunity over the Marines could be exceptionally decided together, con-
sidering the second question incidental to the first one.
33 On the role of compromissory clauses, see Cannizzaro and BonaFé, “Fragmenting 
International Law through Compromissory Clauses? Some Remarks on the Decision of the ICJ 
in the Oil Platforms Case”, EJIL, 2005, p. 481 ff.
34 The term incidental jurisdiction is commonly used in doctrine to mean the jurisdiction 
of an international court or tribunal over an issue that would otherwise be outside the court or 
tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae, but that falls within the court or tribunal’s jurisdiction 
ratione materiae because it is incidental to the dispute. See tzenG, “The Implicated Issue 
Problem: Indispensable Issues and Incidental Jurisdiction”, New York University Journal of 
International Law & Politics, 2018, p. 447 ff. The doctrine is unambiguous in considering that 
international tribunals have the power to decide on certain matters external to the one over 
which they have jurisdiction ratione materiae. This would be possible in the presence of claus-
es in international treaties which expressly refer to external norms (“referral clauses”) or when, 
in order to correctly interpret or apply particular provisions of the convention in question, it 
is necessary to have recourse to fundamental or secondary norms of general international law 
(such as, for example, the law of treaties or the norms of international State responsibility). 
This is in accordance with the principle of systemic integration laid down in Art. 31(3)(c) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980, according to which international treaties are to be interpreted taking into account any 
relevant rule of international law applicable in the relationship between the parties. On the 
requirements that UNCLOS tribunals must assess in order to determine incidental jurisdic-
tion, see sChatz, “Incidental Jurisdiction in the Award in “The ‘Enrica Lexie’ Incident (Italy 
v. India) – Part I”, Völkerrechtsblog, 23 July 2020, available at: <https://voelkerrechtsblog.
org/de/incidental-jurisdiction-in-the-award-in-the-enrica-lexie-incident-italy-v-india-part-i/>. 
See also raJu, “The Enrica Lexie Award – Some Thoughts on ‘Incidental’ Jurisdiction (Part 
II)”, 22 July 2020, Opinio Juris, available at: <http://opiniojuris.org/2020/07/22/the-enrica-
lexie-award-some-thoughts-on-incidental-jurisdiction-part-ii/>. On this subject see also love, 
“Jurisdiction over Incidental Questions in International Law”, ASIL, 2017, p. 316 ff.; Forteau, 
“Regulating the Competition between International Courts and Tribunals. The Role of Ratione 
Materiae Jurisdiction under Part XV of UNCLOS”, The Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals, 2016, p. 195 ff.
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At this point, it is worth noting that establishing whether an international 
specialised tribunal facing a multifaceted dispute can exercise an “incidental ju-
risdiction” over substantive matters that fall outside the scope of its principal 
jurisdiction is of key importance for the case of the Enrica Lexie, and, at the same 
time, of key importance for international law as such. As pointed out by Marotti 
in his contribution, “this question reflects the more general tension between the 
consensual paradigm of international jurisdiction and the need to settle disputes 
in a complete and – to recall the wording of the Arbitral Tribunal – ‘satisfactory’ 
way”.35
From the above we may deduce that in order to establish its competence 
ratione materiae over the question of immunity, the Arbitral Tribunal should 
have demonstrated the existence in the case at hand of exceptional requirements 
since its competence is otherwise limited to the interpretation and application 
of UNCLOS provisions. In order for such a tribunal to be able to exercise inci-
dental jurisdiction, there are two necessary requirements whose recurrence ap-
pears necessary: first, the preliminary determination of the external issue must 
be indispensable to resolving the main dispute; second, the external issue must 
also be ancillary to the main issue, since it cannot constitute the real issue of 
the case nor the object of the claim. These requirements have already been af-
firmed several times by Arbitral Tribunals established on the basis of Annex VII 
of UNCLOS. For example, in the decision of 18 March 2015 in the Chagos 
Marine Protected Area Arbitration,36 and in the decision of 21 February 2020 in 
the dispute between Ukraine and Russia on Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, 
Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait.37 Indeed, the Arbitral Tribunal in the latter decision 
clarified that, in order to qualify an external issue as indispensable and ancillary, 
it is necessary for the tribunal to first define “how the dispute before it should be 
characterized” and thus ascertain wherein resides “the weight of the dispute”.38 
There are serious doubts that in the Enrica Lexie case the Arbitral Tribunal fol-
lowed this approach. In addition, we would have expected solid arguments since 
the delicate issue of incidental competence is of crucial relevance for both the 
present case and for future disputes having to deal with incidental questions. 
Conversely, after explaining that the question of immunity is not covered by 
35 marotti, “A Satisfactory Answer? The Enrica Lexie Award and the Jurisdiction  over 
Incidental Questions”, in this Focus. The importance of striking a fair balance between the 
consensual paradigm of international jurisdiction and the need to settle disputes in a complete 
way was underlined in the past by doctrine, see Cannizzaro and BonaFé, cit. supra note 33, 
passim.
36 PCA Case No. 2011-03, paras. 220-221. In this regard, please refer to sChatz, 
“Incidental Jurisdiction”, cit. supra note 34.
37 Ukraine v. the Russian Federation, Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black 
Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait, PCA Case No. 2017-06. For a commentary see sChatz, 
“The Award concerning Preliminary Objections in Ukraine v. Russia : Observations regarding 
the Implicated Status of Crimea and the Sea of Azov”, EJIL: Talk!, 20 March 2020, avail-
able at: <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-award-concerning-preliminary-objections-in-ukraine-v-
russia-observations-regarding-the-implicated-status-of-crimea-and-the-sea-of-azov/>. 
38 See para. 194 of the decision.
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any UNCLOS provisions, and after referring to only one judicial precedent,39 
together with various legal literature on the topic, the Tribunal decided that the 
entire dispute in the Enrica Lexie case addressed a number of questions relating 
to the interpretation and application of the UNCLOS and that all these questions 
could not be properly decided in the absence of any reference to the question of 
the immunity of the Marines.40
This absence of strong legal arguments is particularly difficult to understand, 
as pointed out by Marotti in his article, given the presence of two strong dissent-
ing opinions. Both opinions address the architecture of the dispute itself, but from 
different angles; on the one hand, Dr Rao begins his analysis from the premise 
that there exist two distinct questions – one concerning the jurisdiction over the 
incident of 12 February 2012, and one concerning the immunity of the Italian of-
ficials – which in his opinion should have been separately examined; on the other 
hand, Judge Robinson begins from the basis that the immunity constitutes the 
real central question of the whole dispute and not an external one. The latter, in 
our view, appears a particularly convincing conclusion which deserved more at-
tention before being rejected by the majority. According to this judge, the lack of 
the ancillary requirement is evident because the external issue of the functional 
immunity of the Italian riflemen not only could not be qualified as a “minor is-
sue”, but represented “the core element of the dispute […] the real issue in the 
dispute between the Parties”,41 as it proved to be decisive for the attribution of 
jurisdiction to Italy. It is also evident that the external issue of immunity was not 
necessary in order to solve the main dispute,42 since this could have been decided 
by the recognition of concurrent jurisdiction of Italy and India,43 and therefore by 
the affirmation of the legitimacy of the Indian criminal jurisdiction.44
39 Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. 
Poland), Judgment of 25 August 1925, PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 6, p. 18 ff. (Award, cit. 
supra note 12, para. 808).
40 See Award, cit. supra note 12, para. 808, in which the arbitral tribunal merely stated 
that the issue of functional immunity was “preliminary or incidental to the application of the 
Convention” and that, in the absence of its definition, it could not “provide a complete answer 
to the question as to which Party may exercise jurisdiction”. On the point see again marotti, 
cit. supra note 35.
41 See Award, cit. supra note 12, Dissenting opinion of Judge Robinson, para. 81.
42 At para. 239 the Arbitral Tribunal itself had in fact recognized that “it was conceivable 
that the dispute between the Parties would be decided without a determination on the question 
of immunity”.
43 And this on the basis of the criteria of active and passive territoriality already referred 
to in para. 367 which states: “the alleged offence was commenced on board the Italian vessel, 
‘Enrica Lexie’, and completed on board the Indian vessel, ‘St. Antony’. According to the ter-
ritoriality principle, both Italy and India are entitled to exercise jurisdiction over the incident”. 
Similarly, para. 839 provides that: “[p]ursuant to Article 58, paragraph 2, and Article 92, each 
Party has exclusive jurisdiction over their respective ship involved in the incident, namely, 
Italy over the ‘Enrica Lexie’ and India over the ‘St. Antony’. The Parties therefore have con-
current jurisdiction over the incident”.
44 Award, cit. supra note 12, para. 840, under which: “At the same time, pursuant to the 
principle of objective territoriality, well established in international law, a State may assert its 
jurisdiction in respect of offences committed outside its territory but consummated within its 
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Notwithstanding the additional factor of having the two clear and well-
grounded dissenting opinions, the Tribunal simply stated that the exercise of 
its jurisdiction over the incident could not be satisfactorily answered without 
addressing the question of the immunity of the Italian Marines. According to 
the majority of the judges, since immunity from jurisdiction “operates as an ex-
ception to an otherwise-existing right to exercise jurisdiction”, such exception 
“forms an integral part of the Arbitral Tribunal’s task to determine which Party 
may exercise jurisdiction over the Marines”.45
In sum, we believe that by establishing that the question of immunity “be-
longs to those ‘questions preliminary or incidental to the application’ of the 
Convention”, the award has probably focused on the need to solve the dispute 
in a complete and satisfactory way, but without taking into enough consideration 
the other side of the coin, regarding the consensual paradigm of international ju-
risdiction. We are not taking here any stance with respect to the specific choice of 
the Tribunal, but rather affirming that, in light of the above illustrated relevance, 
the analysis of this procedural question might have deserved additional atten-
tion. It has been argued that this arbitration decision represents a precedent on 
which to build a new concept of incidental jurisdiction, such as to overcome the 
traditional definition.46 Such a reconstruction does not seem to us to be accept-
able, since the application of a surprisingly broad notion of incidental jurisdic-
tion, without respecting the requirements that have evolved from jurisprudential 
practice, may instead result in an unlimited expansion of the jurisdiction of in-
ternational tribunals. As has been clearly stated by the ICJ, it is necessary, given 
the unquestionable difficulty of balancing the need to adopt a satisfactory and 
complete decision and the need to safeguard the will expressed by the States by 
signing the international treaty and the arbitration clause contained therein, that 
international courts “must not exceed the jurisdiction conferred upon [them] by 
the Parties” but at the same time “exercise that jurisdiction to its full extent”.47
5. the FunCtional immunity oF the italian marines: a missed 
opportunity to asCertain Customary international laW
After having determined its competence over Italy’s claim regarding the 
functional immunity of the Italian officials from Indian criminal jurisdiction, the 
Arbitral Tribunal also had to assess the merit of this claim. In this respect, the 
Tribunal established that India must be precluded from the exercise of its crimi-
territory or, as stated in 1926 by the PCIJ in the S.S. ‘Lotus’ judgment, ‘if one of the constituent 
elements of the offence, and more especially its effects, have taken place [in its territory]’”.
45 Award, cit. supra note 12, paras. 809-811.
46 methymaki and tams, “Immunities and Compromissory Clauses. Making Sense of 
Enrica Lexie (Part I)”, EJIL: Talk!, 27 August 2020, available at: <https://www.ejiltalk.org/
immunities-and-compromissory-clauses-making-sense-of-enrica-lexie-part-i/>.
47 See Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), Judgment of 3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 1985, p. 
13 ff., para. 19. 
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nal jurisdiction over the Italian Marines, since the latter enjoy immunity ratione 
materiae.
The point to which we wish to draw attention, is that this clear-cut stance 
is based on customary international law. Namely, in the absence of a specific 
provision of the UNCLOS dealing with the matter of the functional immunity of 
State officials, the majority of the judges maintained that general international 
law may fill in this normative gap. Confirming the approach adopted to assess 
the procedural aspect, the Tribunal, in order to reach and support its conclusion 
on the merits of the immunity issue, simply relied on two precedents – one set by 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and one by the ICJ 
– and on the ILC’s Draft Articles on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign 
Criminal Jurisdiction.48 In addition, the Tribunal took into consideration the fact 
that India, in its counter-claim, had not specifically questioned the existence of 
a general rule of international law with respect to the immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction of State officials.49
In effect, according to unanimous legal doctrine, as well as to international 
and domestic jurisprudence, a provision of customary international law which 
accords criminal (and civil) immunity to State officials, in respect of their official 
acts or in respect of the acts performed in their official capacity, exists.50 However, 
the existence of such norm is crystal clear only when it comes to specific catego-
ries of State officials, such as diplomatic agents, heads of governments or States, 
and ministries of foreign affairs.51 Yet, with the exception of these senior and 
diplomatic categories of State officials, unanimity with respect to other catego-
ries of State officials is far from being reached. On the one hand, we find both 
ILC Rapporteurs working on a study on the functional (as well as personal) im-
munity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, who have expressly 
accepted the old theory on immunity, according to which all State officials have, 
in principle, the right to functional immunity from foreign jurisdiction regarding 
their official acts.52 This study certainly deserves attention and it is not surprising 
that the Arbitral Tribunal took it into account. This study alone, however, cannot 
be considered decisive for the resolution of the dispute between Italy and India 
or for other more recent cases. On the other hand, indeed, we find that the rule of 
customary international law regarding the functional immunity of State officials 
48 Award, cit. supra note 12, paras. 843-845.
49 Award, cit. supra note 12, para. 846.
50 ConForti, “In tema di immunità degli organi statali stranieri”, RDI, 2010, p. 5 ff.
51 To underline the fact that these categories of State officials should enjoy the benefit of 
immunity from foreign jurisdiction, the doctrine refers to them as “senior members of central 
governments”. In this respect, see, for instance, Fox and WeBB, The Law of State Immunity, 
3rd ed., Oxford, 2015; in relation to immunity of State officials, see also akande and shah, 
“Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts”, EJIL, 
2010, p. 815 ff.
52 See kolodkin, Second Report to the ILC on the Immunity of State Officials from 
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/CN4/631 (2010); esCoBar hernández, Third 
Report to the ILC on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, UN 
Doc. A/CN4/673 (2014).
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from foreign criminal jurisdiction is, as said, somewhat dated and in many cases 
controversial. Most of contemporary international law scholars disagree about its 
scope of application and content.53
Moreover, as authoritatively affirmed in this respect: “[…] what States say at 
international level, [and] the statements of representatives of governments within 
the relevant international organs […] are not conclusive”.54 What should rather 
be considered conclusive are practice and domestic case law since they represent 
the actual context in which State authorities demonstrate their real will to enforce 
international law, and, with respect to immunity, practice and domestic case law 
are not uniform and consistent.55 If we cannot expect an international tribunal to 
53 In favour of immunity in the present case see ronzitti, “The Enrica Lexie Incident”, 
cit. supra note 1. On the different theories, see pisillo mazzesChi, “Organi degli Stati stra-
nieri (immunità giurisdizionale degli)”, in Enciclopedia del Diritto – Annali, Milano, 2014, 
Vol. VII, p. 735 ff.; id., “The Functional Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Jurisdiction: 
A Critique of the Traditional Theories”, Questions of International Law, Zoom out 17 (2015), 
p. 3 ff.
54 ConForti, “A Few Remarks on the Functional Immunity of the Organs of Foreign 
States”, Questions of International Law, Zoom out 17 (2015), p. 69 ff. This, in our view, is also 
true with regard to States’ responses in the ILC’s work on State officials’ immunity, which, on 
the contrary, ronzitti (in this Focus) considers relevant.
55 See, in the sense of the denial of functional immunity in an “automatic” manner, in 
addition to the judgment of the Kerala High Court in the case that concerns us (Latorre and 
Others v. Union of India and Others, 29 May 2012), for example: the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Burma in the Kovtunenko case, 1 March 1960, ILR, Vol. 31, p. 259 ff.; the deci-
sion of the Belgian Court of Cassation in the Sharon and Yaron case (12 February 2003); the 
decision of the English High Court in the Khurts Bat v. Investigating Judge of the Federal 
Court of Germany case (Queen’s Bench Division, 29 July 2011, paras. 70-100); the judgment 
of the Italian Corte di Cassazione of 24 February 2014 in the Abu Omar case, in which the 
Court states: “in this situation to consider the existence of a customary norm appears incor-
rect because there is no consolidated case law, there are no continuous and concordant official 
declarations of the States and there is no univocal doctrinal interpretation” (on this decision, 
and for other examples, see also niGro, in this Focus). It must be underlined that, on the point, 
the Corte di Cassazione (Sez. I penale) had adopted a completely opposite view in its deci-
sion in the Lozano case, 24 July 2008, No. 31171, IYIL, 2008, p. 346 ff., with a comment by 
serra; RDI, 2008, p. 1223 ff., in which the Court, confirming the lack of Italian jurisdiction 
in the well-known Lozano/Calipari case, (affirmed by the Corte di Assise di Roma, 3 January 
2008, No. 21, IYIL, 2007, p. 287 ff., with a comment by serra) substantially moved from the 
assumption according to which the customary principle of immunity of the State for acts jure 
imperii implies as a “natural corollary” the immunity of its individual bodies for the same type 
of acts, otherwise the useful effect of the first principle would be depleted. Therefore, any act 
carried out by an individual-organ in the exercise of official functions delegated to it by the 
State, and as such explicating a sovereign activity, would be exempt from criminal judgment 
insofar as attributable to the State itself, unless the act in question constitutes an international 
crime. On the logical limits of the parallelism between the immunity of the individual-organ 
and the immunity of the State, see the considerations made by de sena and de vittor, 
“Immunità degli Stati dalla giurisdizione e violazione di diritti dell’uomo: la sentenza della 
Cassazione italiana nel caso Ferrini”, Giur. It., 2005, p. 255 ff. It should also not be forgotten 
that there are much more radical theses which even cast doubts on the general character of the 
immunity of States and the – consequent – exceptional character of the exercise of jurisdiction 
(in this sense, BianChi, “L’immunité des Etats et les violations graves des droits de l’homme: 
la fonction de l’interprète dans la détermination du droit international”, RGDIP, 2004, p. 69 
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make express reference to all the domestic case law on the issue, we can expect a 
ruling supported by profound and significant grounds. Legal exception to general 
rules should always be adequately substantiated. This consideration appears even 
more important with reference to the subject of immunities, which affects the 
power of the State to exercise its jurisdiction, and therefore the fundamental right 
of the individual to take legal action. It is no coincidence that the development 
of guarantees for the protection of human rights has been accompanied by a pro-
gressive reduction in the scope of immunity. Moreover, jurisdiction in criminal 
matters is one of the most significant attributes of State sovereignty, almost the 
“hard core” of sovereignty, as evidenced, for example, by the modalities relating 
to the progressive construction of the European Union. In fact, criminal jurisdic-
tion is one of the subjects which has not yet been transferred from the States to 
the institutions of the Union. Any hypothesis of renunciation or cession by the 
State in this matter, therefore, must be evaluated carefully, must be ascertained 
without any possibility of doubt, and above all must be interpreted restrictively. 
Since functional immunity entails an exception to the normal exercise of jurisdic-
tion by the State of the forum (as well as a restriction of the right of access to a 
judge), the existence of the customary principle must be demonstrated rigorously 
and on the basis of a broad, consolidated and uniform international practice, as 
well as on a well demonstrated opinio juris.56
The mere attribution to the State of the act carried out by the individual as 
its organ does not, therefore, automatically entail the activation of functional 
immunity in favour of the latter. Nor can it be said that the customary norm on 
immunity covers all the acts performed by the individual-organ in the exercise of 
its functions, given that it is limited, as we know, to acts jure imperii. Moreover, 
even if an autonomous norm on functional immunity is considered to exist, its 
object is certainly not the indiscriminate protection of any individual-organ, for 
any conduct on behalf of the State.57 At most, it aims, in fact, to provide protec-
tion from judicial interference to certain functions of the foreign State. In short, 
functional immunity is enjoyed, as has been said, only by those high-ranking 
individual-organs that normally entertain the State’s relations with other subjects 
ff., or which view the granting of immunity as a mere international courtesy (cf. the consider-
ations of lauterpaCht, “The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States”, BYIL, 
1951, p. 227 ff., and, more recently, the position of Caplan, “State Immunity, Human Rights, 
and Jus Cogens: a Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory”, AJIL, 2003, p. 744 ff.). For 
more details on the issue of functional immunity see de sena, Diritto internazionale e immu-
nità funzionale degli organi statali, Milano, 1996; Frulli, Immunità e crimini internazionali. 
L’esercizio della giurisdizione penale e civile nei confronti degli organi statali sospettati di 
gravi crimini internazionali, Torino, 2007; van aleBeek, The Immunity of States and their 
Officials in International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law, Oxford, 2008; 
niGro, Le immunità giurisdizionali dello Stato e dei suoi organi e l’evoluzione della sovranità 
nel diritto internazionale, Padova, 2018.
56 This writer highlighted these aspects in particular in relation to the decision of the 
Cassazione in the Lozano case, cit. supra note 55. See Cataldi and serra, “Ordinamento 
italiano e corpi di spedizione all’estero, fra diritto umanitario, diritto penale e tutela dei diritti 
umani”, DUDI, 2010, p. 141 ff.
57 In this sense, see already de sena, cit. supra note 55, p. 52 ff. and p. 241 ff.
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of international law, or by individuals exercising specific functions protected by 
international law only for those acts that are typically performed by the organ 
they embody. This is the “hard core” of the functional immunity norm. Outside 
this perimeter, recognition of immunity cannot be presumed, but must always be 
demonstrated.
Additionally, the Arbitral Tribunal took a clear-cut stance on a matter that is 
topical for international relations, not only for relations between Italy and India 
in the case at stake. In 2008, in the case Djibouti v. France, the ICJ was required 
by the Parties to determine whether questions on immunity should be decided on 
a case-by-case basis or on the basis of a general rule of international law.58 The 
ICJ opted for the first route and left open the issue of clarifying the conditions 
according to which immunity from foreign jurisdiction can apply. The existence 
of a customary principle on the functional immunity of military personnel as 
State organs will therefore continue to be the subject of debate in doctrine, also 
because we do not believe that in this regard the Tribunal (nor the ILC to whose 
work the Tribunal referred59) has made a significant contribution to the matter 
with the decision under consideration, having provided no decisive argument 
or evidence as to the existence of such a principle. The Tribunal affirmed the 
existence of the customary principle by referring, as mentioned above, to only 
two judgments60 one of which is not relevant,61 while the other is susceptible to 
criticism because it in turn recalls irrelevant case law.62 As regards, more specifi-
58 Both submissions are available on the ICJ website, see Certain Questions of Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment of 4 June 2008, ICJ Reports 
2008, p. 177 ff.
59 See Award, cit. supra note 12, para. 849, in which the Tribunal recalls the ILC Draft 
Articles on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction adopted in 2016.
60 Award, cit. supra note 12, paras. 808 and 844, in which the Tribunal recalls, as evi-
dence of the existence of a customary principle, the 29 October 1997 Judgment of the Appeal 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. 
Tihomir Blaškic, as well as the ICJ decision in the case Djibouti v. France, cit. supra note 58.
61 It should be noted that in Djibouti v. France, the ICJ did not rule on Djibouti’s request 
to recognize functional immunity to the Prosecutor of the Republic and the Head of National 
Security from French criminal jurisdiction, stating that the exception of immunity had not been 
raised before the French courts. Therefore, the dispute can in no way provide evidence of the 
existence of the customary principle. On the point see ConForti, “In tema di immunità”, cit. 
supra note 50, p. 10.
62 The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in its 1997 decision in the case 
Prosecutor v. Blaškić excludes the possibility of issuing injunctions for purposes of inves-
tigation against State bodies, stating that they enjoy functional immunity under customary 
international law. However, this assertion is not founded on solid grounds, since the Appeals 
Chamber cites, in support of its thesis, four cases, among which one (US Supreme Court, 
Waters v. Collot, 2 US 247 (1796)) is very old and above all does not concern immunity from 
criminal jurisdiction but rather immunity from civil jurisdiction, therefore is not very signifi-
cant. The other cases cited (McLeod, Eichmann and Rainbow Warrior) tend to disprove, rather 
than confirm, this thesis. In fact, McLeod was tried by the Supreme Court of New York for the 
burning of the ship Caroline (People v. McLeod, 6 July 1841, Wendell’s Law Reports, 1840-
1841, p. 483 ff.) and, similarly, the two secret agents of the French Government were tried 
before the District Court of Auckland, New Zealand, for having blown up the ship Rainbow 
Warrior (Judgment of 4 November 1985). Adolf Eichmann (in ILR, Vol. 36, pp. 277-342) is not 
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cally, the immunity of military personnel abroad, it should be noted that the rules 
on jurisdiction over the latter are for the most part the subject of a conventional 
discipline, since they are set out in Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), which 
are based on the model of the agreement concluded within NATO in London in 
1951. The practice of States to resort to conventional forms of protection must 
be interpreted as evidence of States’ lack of conviction regarding the existence 
of a customary rule on the functional immunity of military personnel abroad, 
the existence of which would clearly make the conclusion of such agreements 
superfluous.63
Even if we accept that there is a rule of general international law which con-
fers functional immunity on military personnel, there are still a number of ques-
tions concerning the applicability of this (alleged) rule of general international 
law to the marines in the Enrica Lexie case. While there is no doubt that the two 
soldiers were organs of the State,64 in our opinion, contrary to the Tribunal’s find-
ing that the two marines were acting “in the exercise of their official functions”,65 
relevant for the purpose of recognizing the existence of the customary principle because first 
of all it was a case of judging international crimes; in this dispute, moreover, the Court rejected 
the exceptions of lack of jurisdiction and tried and condemned Eichmann. Among other things, 
it should be noted that the arguments used to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court referred not 
to functional immunity, but to the different doctrine of the “act of State” (Eichmann’s actions 
were carried out in Germany and in execution of decrees of its government, attributable only 
to the German State, and foreign judges could not judge on such acts because they were carried 
out by a foreign State on its territory).
63 The relationship of treaties with custom is one of exception to the rule. States, in order 
to derogate from a general rule, or in order to fill a gap in the general law, will put in place 
conventional rules. If the spread of agreements, with repetition of identical rules, is significant, 
it is believed that this circumstance may be sufficient to prove the existence of a customary 
rule, at least in statu nascendi. The proliferation of bilateral agreements between the sending 
State and the territorial State on the status of participants in multinational forces (SOFA) is 
undeniable. But it is precisely the continued, persistent proliferation of these treaties which, 
in our opinion, further confirms that the rule invoked by the Court does not exist, at least not 
for the time being. For further details on these aspects, please refer to Cataldi and serra, cit. 
supra note 56, p. 153 ff.
64 According to the definition contained in Art. 4 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, what matters for the attribution of the status of 
State organ is the qualification of such subject under domestic law, as well as the fact that this 
subject has the power to represent the State or act on behalf of the latter in all those matters in 
which the latter exercises sovereign prerogatives. In the case of the two military personnel in-
volved, there is no doubt that they were State organs as they were riflemen of the Italian Navy, 
and therefore a branch of the armed forces which, pursuant to Art. 110 of the Code of Military 
Order (Legislative Decree No. 66 of 15 March 2010) “constitutes the operational maritime 
component of the State’s military defence”. In addition, Law No. 130 of 2011 assigned to the 
Chief and members of the Navy embarked in anti-piracy function on commercial ships, respec-
tively the roles of officer and judicial police officer for the repression of piracy offences under 
Arts. 1135 and 1136 of the Navigation Code. See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentary, YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 40. 
On this point, with reference to the case in question, see BusCo and Fontanelli, “Questioni 
di giurisdizione e immunità nella vicenda dell’Enrica Lexie, alla luce del diritto internaziona-
le”, Diritto penale contemporaneo, 2013, p. 40 ff.
65 Award, cit. supra note 12, para. 862.
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the presence of the marines on the Enrica Lexie was not justified by the need to 
protect State functions, but by the need to defend that specific commercial vessel 
from possible pirate attacks.66 The Enrica Lexie was not a military ship autho-
rized to repress piracy under Article 110 UNCLOS, nor was there any interna-
tional anti-piracy cooperation coordinated by the United Nations or specifically 
established between Italy and India.67 It should also be noted that the presence 
of military personnel on the Italian tanker was at the expense of the shipowner 
and not on the basis of an international agreement or a resolution of the Security 
Council,68 but on the basis of domestic Italian Law No. 130 of 201169 and the 
agreement that the Ministry of Defence and the private confederation of Italian 
shipowners Confitarma concluded on 11 October 2011.70 The hypothesis would 
have been quite different if the Italian State (and not individual ship owners) 
had decided to enlist military personnel on board all ships flying the Italian flag 
in piracy-prone areas. Only in this case could it be assumed, without any need 
of further demonstration, that the State was exercising its sovereign functions.71 
Therefore, even if we admit the existence of the customary principle of func-
66 In the same sense, see niGro, in this Focus. As expressly stated in Art. 5(6-ter) of Law 
No 130 of 2011, the use of military protection units may in no way entail additional costs for 
the State.
67 The point is underlined by FoCarelli, Trattato di diritto internazionale, 2015, p. 754 
ff.
68 As is well known, the Security Council has dealt with the repression of international 
piracy in particular with reference to events taking place off the coast of Somalia. It is worth 
remembering especially Resolution No. 1814 of 15 May 2008 with which the Security Council 
asked States to act in agreement with the Somali government to protect ships and humanitarian 
aid to Somalia, and Resolution 1851 of 16 December 2008 with which States are authorized 
to enter Somali territorial waters and adopt “all necessary means to repress acts of piracy 
and armed robbery” (para. 6). On the international actions against piracy, see GuilFoyle 
(ed.), Modern Piracy: Legal Challenges and Responses, Cheltenham, 2013; koutrakos 
and skordas (eds.), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea: European and International 
Perspectives, Oxford, 2014; del ChiCCa, La pirateria marittima, Torino, 2016; BevilaCqua, 
Criminalità e sicurezza in alto mare, Napoli, 2017.
69 As already mentioned, this law authorized the presence of armed personnel on board 
commercial ships. In this regard, please refer to BevilaCqua, “Counter Piracy Armed Services, 
The Italian System and the Search for Clarity on the Use of Force at Sea”, IYIL, 2012, p. 50 
ff.; riCCiutelli, “La recente normativa sulle misure di contrasto alla pirateria marittima”, 
The Italian Maritime Journal, 2011, p. 2 ff.; ronzitti, “Un passo avanti per la tutela delle 
navi italiane ma troppa cautela nella legge di conversione”, Guida al diritto – Il Sole 24 Ore, 
No. 43, 2011, p. 54 ff.; harloW, “Soldiers at Sea: The Legality and Policy Implications of 
Using Military Security Teams to Combat Piracy”, Southern California Interdisciplinary Law 
Journal, 2012, p. 561 ff.; tondini, “Impiego di NMP e guardie giurate in funzione antipirate-
ria”, Rivista marittima, 2013, p. 32 ff.
70 The text of the agreement is available at: <http://www.unife.it/giurisprudenza/
giurisprudenza/studiare/diritti-umani-conflitti-armati/materiale-da-archiviare/dudu-2013/
salerno/A_101011_Protocollo_Difesa_CONFITARMA_UG.pdf>.
71 Different opinions have been sustained in doctrine in this regard. See in particular: 
ronzitti, “The Enrica Lexie Incident”, cit. supra note 1; eBoli and pierini, “Coastal State 
Jurisdiction Over Vessel Protection Detachments and Immunity Issues: The Enrica Lexie 
Case”, Revue de droit militaire et de droit de la guerre, 2012, p. 117 ff.; Carella, Il caso dei 
“marò” e il diritto internazionale, Bari, 2013. 
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tional immunity as relied on by the majority of the judges, it is our opinion that 
such principle was not automatically applicable to the case at hand, since the two 
Marines, although exercising the typical functions connected to the security of 
the ship and its crew, were acting on behalf of private subjects and not on behalf 
of the Italian State. Therefore, also on this point, the Tribunal should have set out 
a more thorough and well-argued motivation.72
6. ConCludinG remarks
The decision commented on here has the undoubted merit of putting an end 
to a long-standing dispute between the two States, leaving both of them satis-
fied, all things considered, with the result obtained. Italy has seen the recogni-
tion of the principle of functional immunity from criminal jurisdiction of its two 
soldiers, with the consequence that it does not have to return them to India and 
can instead prosecute them at home. The Government of New Delhi, for its part, 
obtained the Tribunal’s decision confirming Italy’s violation of the freedom of 
navigation on the high seas, with the consequent obligation to pay compensation 
for damages.
However, with all due respect to the Tribunal, with a 406-page judgment, 
dissenting opinions included, it was reasonable to expect more convincing and 
detailed arguments on the individual points decided. In fact, on the one hand, 
the Arbitration Tribunal treated as incidental an issue that was perhaps not so 
incidental, and, on the other hand, it acknowledged the existence and application 
of the customary rule on the functional immunity of military personnel without 
giving adequate reasons. In this regard, let us reiterate what has already been said 
above, namely that the adoption of an expanded notion of incidental jurisdiction 
lends itself to an unlimited extension of the jurisdiction of international courts 
and that the recognition of the existence and applicability of functional immunity 
must be adequately proven, as it involves a derogation from the normal criteria 
of attribution of jurisdiction as well as a restriction of the fundamental right of 
access to justice, provided by national and supranational systems of protection 
of human rights. The need to reach a compromise between the Parties in an equi-
table spirit has therefore prevailed over a strict application of the law. It remains 
only to take note of it.
72 In the same sense, see in particular the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Patrick Robinson 
(paras. 63-70).
